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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution does not use the words federal or federalism. It gives
Congress a set of powers and prohibits the national government, the states,
or both from doing some things.' The Court has inferred principles of
federalism from those provisions.2
The political science community has treated the advantages of
federalism as contingent on whether federalism deepens or diffuses conflict
or opens competition for power.3 The United States Supreme Court's
* Professor, Albany Law School; B.A. Princeton University; LL.B. Yale Law School. Earlier
drafts of this essay were presented at annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association
and the New England Political Science Association. The author wishes to express his appreciation
to the participants at those sessions, and to his research assistant, Sarah Merritt.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995) ("[T]here is widespread
acceptance of our authority to enforce the dormant Commerce Clause, which we have but inferred
from the constitutional structure as a limitation on the power of the States."); see also infra note 65
and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1960); Bernard Grofman & Robert Stockwell, Institutional
Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy, CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY (2001), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
approach does neither; it has been trying to clarify and police a very
different boundary. Even on its own terms, however, the Court's
justifications do not work-a problem made clearer by reference to the
empirically based work of political science. The result is that the Court's
focus misses entirely the kinds of questions which might affect the security
of the union or the quality of American democracy.
The first section of this essay will describe the Court's efforts to create a
categorical federalism and its explanations for its approach. The second
section is included to make clear that there are alternative approaches to
federalism, in the absence of which further analysis would be pointless. The
third section of this essay outlines major lines of inquiry by political
scientists and their conclusions. Finally, this essay compares the Court's
definitional federalism and its explanations for its approach with the
concerns of political scientists. This essay concludes that the Supreme
Court's categorical federalism is at best irrelevant and at worst a barrier to
contemporary conflict resolution.
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Rehnquist Court tried to make some clear distinctions about
congressional power. Congress can regulate economic transactions that
affect interstate commerce.4 But it cannot regulate social issues like
violence against women or children that may affect interstate commerce.5
To allow those kinds of regulation, the Court feared, would erase the line
between state and national power.6
The Rehnquist Court offered textual, historical, and instrumental
justifications. Textually, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in United States v.
Lopez that the enumeration of powers and the establishment of a federal
system required enforcement of a line between congressional and state
power.7 Historically, the Court argued that interstate conflicts were the
source of the commerce power and implied a limitation on it.' The Court
also revived the pre-Civil War argument about the sovereignty of the
individual states and therefore the limited grant of power to the national
governments by the states in joining the new union. 9
?article= 1075&context-csd.
4. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
5. Id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
6. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602.
7. Id. at 552 (discussing the "constitutionally mandated division of authority").
8. Id. at 555 ("Activities that affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress'
power .... ).
9. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 86 (1996) (relying on Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-53, 564 (offering a textual explanation of the limitation of
congressional powers and referring to areas "where States historically have been sovereign"); see
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Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have been most vigorous in asserting
institutional justifications for the federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court. Though frustrating decisions of elected branches of government, they
asserted that federalism was necessary in aid of democracy. Justice
O'Connor laid out the analysis in New York v. United States, involving
federal directives to states:
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If
the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making
provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That
view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is
contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and
it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the
decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.
Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion,
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal
regulation. iO
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor feared that if Congress directs states to
do something, citizens will not know whom to credit or blame for the results.
In Lopez, Justice Kennedy, concurring in a 5-4 decision, applied the idea to a
case involving overlapping jurisdiction: "[C]itizens must have some means
of knowing which of the two governments to hold accountable for the failure
to perform a given function."" Later, Justice Kennedy expanded the
discussion:
[F]reedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as
intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the
also id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (citations omitted). Justice
Kennedy joined the majority opinion. See id. at 144.
11. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
conduct of their office. If state enactments were allowed to
condition or control certain actions of federal legislators,
accountability would be blurred, with the legislators having the
excuse of saying that they did not act in the exercise of their best
judgment but simply in conformance with a state mandate. 12
And in Alden v. Maine, he added: "When the Federal Government
asserts authority over a State's most fundamental political processes, it
strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our liberty
and republican form of government." 3
The Court's "centrist" block 14 stressed that state sovereignty protected
liberty and self-government, and that clearly demarcated responsibility
would aid voters' ability to credit or blame government for official acts. As
Justice Kennedy explained:
[I]t was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by
the creation of two governments, not one. "In the compound
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself."' 5
The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires
for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the
second between the citizens and the States. If, as Madison expected, the
Federal and State Governments are to control each other, and hold each
other in check by competing for the affections of the people, those citizens
must have some means of knowing which of the two governments to hold
accountable for the failure to perform a given function. "Federalism serves
to assign political responsibility, not to obscure it.' 6  Were the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory. The resultant
inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to the citizens
12. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (citations omitted).
13. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. The "centrist block" included Justice Kennedy and former Justice O'Connor.
15. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison)).
16. Id. at 577 (citing FTC v. Ticor Title Ins, Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
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is more dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote
central power. 17
Local control could mean greater personal control over democracy:
"Our Nation's Founders ... wrote a Constitution... which... assumed []
democratic citizen participation in government at all levels, including levels
that facilitated citizen participation closer to a citizen's home." 8
The conservatives' 9 add that the Court is needed to secure the benefits
of federalism. This claim was rejected in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.20  But the Rehnquist Court did not follow
Garcia in this respect. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy considered and rejected
the possibility that the balance between state and federal powers should be
treated as a political question:
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution,
separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and
federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to be much
uncertainty respecting the existence, and the content, of standards
that allow the Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the
design contemplated by the Framers .... Our role in preserving the
federal balance seems more tenuous.2'
Justice Kennedy understood that one could read the constitutional
design differently: "To be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from
The Federalist Papers is that the balance between national and state power is
entrusted in its entirety to the political process. 22 But he concluded that the
Court played an essential role:
[T]he absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials to
undertake this principled task, and the momentary political
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue
against a complete renunciation of the judicial role. Although it is
17. Id. at 576-77 (citations omitted); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-14 (Kennedy, J.) (offering a
historical justification).
18. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. The justices considered "conservative" on the Rehnquist Court included Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, generally joined by the more moderate conservative
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
20. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
21. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 577.
the obligation of all officers of the Government to respect the
constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a part of
our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing
freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far.23
Based on this trio of justifications, from text, history, and consequences
for liberty and democracy, the Rehnquist Court inferred a view of federalism
in which congressional power is contained. The consequences of this
containment of powers affect central congressional activities of the past half
century, including the protection of civil rights and the environment.24
CHARTS OF ROBERTS COURTS FEDERALISM CASES
KEY:
US = opinion in favor of the party asserting the application of federal law
State = opinion in favor of the party asserting the application of state law
1 st Am. = opinion in favor of applying the First Amendment to the state action at issue
X opinion denying the relevance of state interest
? opinion raised a federalism issue without resolving it
A did not address the issue
- = did not participate
Nexus refers to Kennedy's attempt to define a middle ground in the Rapanos decision
23. Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
24. On civil rights, see Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (holding that Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act by state employers); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
(finding no private right of action to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d, and no agency power to interpret the Act to cover disparate impact discrimination); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Violence Against Women Act could not be
applied to private violence); and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be applied to state employees). However,
for contrasting civil rights decisions, see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006) (ruling on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 that questions of state law relating
to the validity of a contract containing an arbitration agreement must be submitted to the arbitrator);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that federal regulation of narcotics applied to entirely
local transactions); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding application of the Americans
with Disabilities Act to access to state courts); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003) (upholding the application of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 to the states). On the
environment, see Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (limiting the coverage of the
statutory term "the waters of the United States" to "relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water"); and Solid Waste Agency of North Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (reading "navigable waters" to exclude the protection of migratory
birds with respect to isolated wetlands regardless of effects on interstate commerce).
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TABLE 1
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
o ~ ~ E A
Constitution as a Limit on States
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct.
1951 (2006) (First Amendment
did not protect government I< < <
employee speech within official ( 5 j C ( z Z z
duties)
- Opinion: Kennedy
United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151 (2006) (holding
abrogation of sovereign
immunity for violation of 14th ;D I D ;
Amend. §1 re cruel and unusual
punishment in prison valid)
- Opinion: Scalia
Constitution as a Limit on United States
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct.
1610 (2007) (upholding federal -< < <
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act)
- Opinion: Kennedy
What Federalism?
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TABLE 2
STATUTORY QUESTIONS
>
State Statute at Issue
Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 127 S, Ct. 1559 Z
(2007) (preemption of state I Z I
banking regulation)
- Opinion: Gtnsburg
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243 (2006) (sustaining 2
the authorit of the Oregon I
Death With Dignity Act) Z A n j
- Opinion: Kennedy
Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding
federal bar of medical
marijuana) - Opinion:
Stevens [Rehnquist Court; I
for comparison with
Oregon, above; not
included in Roberts Court
totals below]
Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440 (2006) (holding Federal
Arbitration Act required V )
that state law challenge to
contract validity go to
arbitrator)
- Opinion: Scalia
No State Statute at Issue
Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)
(limiting federal regulation - -2 U i
of wetlands) - Plurality: I
Scalia; concurrence:
Kennedy
Central Va. Cmty. Coil v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)
(bankruptcy versus state Z Z Z
sovereign immunity) C A C
-Opinion: Stevens
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TABLE 3
OTHER QUESTIONS
1L e
Federal Judicial Power
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.
Ct. 2516 (2006) (reversing
state court interpretation of I ; < <
federal law) - Opinion:
Thomas
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459 (2006) (federal suit
similar but not identical to [ t i U U) U U)
state districting suit should 55
not have been dismissed)
- per curiam
Other State Interests
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(standing to sue to force I .
EPA to act) - Opinion: En C Ci
Stevens
United Haulers Assoc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786 (2007) (sustaining
ordinances requiring waste U U) U C C
delivery to county solid
waste facilities) - Opinion:
Roberts
TABLE 4
TOTALS
Subtotal: 5' 11 7 """ "
Constitutional Cases
Subtotal: < < <
Statutory Cases " -
II I II - II I II II II II
II , ~ II
Subtotal: 7 7 7 'Federal Judicial Power and < < <
Other State Interests II II
II II II II Ii II II II
TOTALS 7
[Note: Roberts Court totals <
do not include Gonzales v. <I 7. 7" 7 7 , ,
7 f#
Raich, above, a Rehnquist H <
Court decision] 7
Ote tte I trst i I I II I II II lI
C.E'a l .
U) CA U) UWU ) U)
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III. THE ROBERTS COURT 25
Federalism promises to continue to be a battleground on the Roberts
Court. Justice Thomas may have held out a red flag in the partial birth
abortion controversy by calling attention to the question of whether
Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to restrict that
procedure even though it passed muster with Justice Thomas and the Court
under the Due Process Clause.26
Where the justices have discussed federalism, their rationales and their
implications are less clear on the Roberts than on the Rehnquist Court.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had developed instrumental rationales that
defined many of the cases in the Rehnquist years.27 With Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court, less has been
said about the reasons for or consequences of federalism. Instead the
conservative justices have focused on text, 28 intent,29 doctrine, 3  and a
relatively generalized concern about Congress trenching too far into local
control. 3' Thus one has to discern what the justices care about largely from
their decisions, rather than from expressed principles. A partial exception is
25. Due to the time constraints of publication, research for this article covers the Roberts Court
during the entire 2005 term through cases decided on or before June 4, 2007. There are three cases
in which federalism was mentioned in the 2006 term that were decided after this article was
prepared. In Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2854-55 (2007), the Court raised federalism as
a reason not to push petitioners to raise the competence of counsel at an earlier point in the
proceedings; in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007), the
Court mentioned federalism in passing in denying taxpayer standing to object to the activities of
federal officials who worked with local organizations; and in Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2325
(2007), the Court mentioned federalism as a reason for the applicable standard of review on a
petition for habeas relief from a conviction in state court. Other issues affecting state power were
raised in National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007)
(approving transfer of "permitting authority" from EPA to state officials); and Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding that states
could not take race into account in pupils' school assignments). Because of time constraints none of
these cases could be considered for this article.
26. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007).
27. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
28. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (construing "waters of the United States").
29. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (discussing congressional intent).
30. Discussion of doctrine is of course ubiquitous in judicial decisions. See, e.g., Rapanos, 126
S. Ct. at 2224 (discussing the impact of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
31. Id. at 2224 (expressing concern over federal regulation of "immense stretches of intrastate
land," and "impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use," and
describing land use planning as "a quintessential state and local power").
the categorical treatment of the dormant Commerce Clause by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, expressed as a consequence of text and original intent.32
The liberal justices 33 have been more cohesive and the conservative
justices less so on federalism issues.3 4 Perhaps that is unavoidable since the
liberals don't see the significant limits to federal power that the
conservatives do. The latter, therefore, have to balance and choose, despite
Justice Scalia's often expressed distaste for balance and his efforts to carve
out areas where he finds it unnecessary.35
A striking fact about the Roberts Court is that most of its decisions have
been nationalist in direction. 36 Even the conservative justices on the Roberts
Court have supported a good deal of federal power.37 Only with respect to
regulation of wetlands and state sovereign immunity in federal bankruptcy
court have a majority of the conservative members of the Roberts Court
opposed federal power."
Federalism is generally understood as a set of constitutional doctrines.
The Rehnquist Court has generally discussed federalism in the context of the
constitutionality of the exercise of federal power. 39 But those cases give us
only a partial picture of what the justices' views about national and state
power are. Many of the statutory cases are close cases in which there are
strong reasons to support either state or national power.
Plainly, if Congress has authority to act, it has the authority to exclude
the states. 40 As Justice Scalia has pointed out in the context of the Negative
Commerce Clause, Congress can exclude or allow state action, regardless of
whether the Court interferes. 4' That is also true in the context of the
interpretation of ambiguous federal statutes.42 So it is hardly clear that the
32. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1798
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. The Supreme Court justices constituting the "liberal" block of the Court include Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, although "less conservative" might be a more accurate label.
34. See Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases, supra.
35. See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has described
balancing as "like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. See Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases, supra.
37. See Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases, supra.
38. See infra note 45 and Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases on conflicting federal and
state statutes, supra.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress did not
have authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1798
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (holding that where a federal statute is
ambiguous, the Court "will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state
governmental functions").
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Court should just get a pass as if there are no federalism concerns when it
decides whether statutes allow concurrent regulation.4 3
The Roberts Court and a majority of its conservative members excluded
concurrent regulation in two of the three cases that raised it, although the
wings of the Court flipped on which two.44 The Court's conservatives
united in opposition to federal power only when doing so did not require
sustaining state regulatory power.45
A second striking fact about the Roberts Court is the conservative
hostility to regulation, regardless of which level of government is the
regulator.46 Wachovia and Buckeye excluded state regulation; Rapanos
limited federal regulation, and the four remaining conservatives since Justice
O'Connor's retirement would also have limited federal regulation of
bankruptcy in Central Virginia Community College.47 Paralleling their
position in opposition to federal environmental regulation in Rapanos, the
conservative justices opposed state standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, where
the states were trying to obtain federal environmental regulation. 48  Jed
Rubenfeld refers to this inquiry as juxtaposition across doctrines. 49  The
parallels speak loudly. 50 Regardless of whether these anti-regulatory goals
are appropriate or inappropriate, they are not about federalism.
IV. OTHER DEFINITIONS OF FEDERALISM
Federalism can be understood or interpreted in a variety of ways. The
Court has sometimes allocated potentially overlapping powers by the
motives it thought proper to the national and state governments, 5' by what
43. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (preemption of state banking
regulation); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (sustaining the authority of the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 46 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding Federal
Arbitration Act required that state law challenge to contract validity go to arbitrator).
45. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (limiting federal regulation of wetlands);
Central Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (bankruptcy versus state sovereign immunity).
46. For a parallel view of Chief Justice Rehnquist, see STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY
IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA 59-62, 237-38 (2000). For an
examination of Rule I Ob-5 cases that treats the last decade of the Rehnquist Court as nationalist in
its regulatory agenda, see Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule lOb-5 and the
Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17 (2005).
47. See Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases, supra.
48. See Chart of Roberts Court Federalism Cases, supra.
49. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, Ill YALE L.J. 1141, 1144-45 (2002).
50. Id. I have described a similar inquiry as interpretive consistency. GOTTLIEB, supra note 46,
at 28-29.
51. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding that
was most effectively done at the national or state level,52 or as properly
overlapping and limited only by the Supremacy Clause. 3
At one time the Court announced that Congress could regulate the
instrumentalities of commerce like planes, trains, and the things that crossed
state lines, but not manufacturing, agriculture, or insurance, no matter how
closely tied to interstate commerce, national economic health, or other
common problems. 4 Justice Thomas has referred wistfully to that era,
suggesting we should return to it." But by 1937 our economy became
increasingly interrelated, and for the following half century the Court blurred
the former distinctions, permitting regulation of whatever affected interstate
commerce,5 6 based on the 1824 formula of Chief Justice Marshall.5 7 This
remains the contemporary doctrine within the category of economic
transactions. 
58
International examples add still more ways to understand federalism.
States in the international order have complete control over internal matters
but are limited in the actions they can take that affect other nations.' 9
Nations give geographic sub-units different degrees of power and different
decisions to make. 60  Europe and a variety of international organizations
Congress could not accomplish by taxation what it could not do by regulation).
52. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319-20 (1851) (holding that the federal
commerce power bars state regulation in the absence of a federal statute only if the subject matter
requires exclusively federal legislation).
53. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate whatever
affects commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824) (holding that Congress' commerce
power is not limited by the possibility that states might wish to regulate the same behavior for state
purposes).
54. The Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the power to regulate instrumentalities of
commerce regardless of the interstate effects of the behavior regulated, or whether the regulation
was direct or via the taxing and spending powers. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (manufacturing); Bailey, 259 U.S. at 20 (manufacturing); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (slaughterhouse); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)
(insurance); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (mining); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (agriculture).
55. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111.
57. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194. Marshall wrote:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.
Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as
the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns
more States than one.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that federal regulation of narcotics
applied to entirely local transactions).
59. See MICHAEL WALZER, ONTOLERATION21 (1997).
60. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790
(1999).
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subscribe to a principle they call "subsidiarity," by which decisions of policy
are made at the most appropriate level and then carried out by the lowest
level of government capable of doing the job.6'
All these systems devolve power and are often described as federalism.
Under the Court's definition of federalism, principles that animate federal
systems in many parts of the world are simply unconstitutional here-not
because of any explicit command of the Constitution but because of
inferences the Court draws from the bare facts of the powers, prohibitions,
and representative arrangements-what might be called the "spirit" of
federalism62-- despite the attacks the same justices have made against other
unwritten inferences from the Constitution.63
V. POLITICAL SCIENTISTS' CONCERNS
Most political scientists think federalism is important, but their view of
federal arrangements is very different. For them the major objectives are
stability, conflict resolution, and democratization.64 As a result they think of
federalism in largely pragmatic terms. One large group of political scientists
supports whatever the principal factions can agree on that will alleviate
strains in the political system, as long as the territorial divisions cross, rather
than deepen fault lines in society. Another significant group believes that
some particularly deep divisions need a form of veto over national policies
61. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994).
62. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) ("[S]overeign immunity derives not from the
Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself"); see, e.g., Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-268 (1997) ("[T]he broader concept of immunity,
implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and
exemplifying ...."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("(W]e reconfirm that the
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment .... ).
63. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
64. Bernard Grofman and Robert Stockwell point to the dynamics, suggesting the validity of
apparently contrary inferences-federal societies with group boundaries that track federal divisions
will be more unstable and undemocratic than federal societies with more cross-cutting federal
divisions; but federal societies with strong group divisions may be more stable and democratic with
unitary federal divisions than cross-cutting ones, because they may not be able to achieve peace and
unity without such divisions. Grofman & Stockwell, supra note 3. In part, their article makes an
important distinction between mechanisms and institutions that perpetuate or minimize ethnicity in
mass and elite contexts. Id. at 6-8, including Table I at 7.
to prevent injury, or the perception of injury, to their national or religious
groups. 65
Federalism may be the midwife of emerging democracy.66 But political
scientists treat as federal all manner of devolutions of power.
Germany is federal though the lander (federal subunits) are required to
carry out national policy, 67 and the United States is federal though it has a
powerful central bureaucracy which Germany now lacks. 68 What definition
of federalism is constructive depends on national and local politics. And
that definition is constructive when, if, and to the extent that it diffuses
power or conflict, and does not hobble government or threaten minorities.
69
Yugoslavia, for example, functioned for a lengthy period as a federal
republic.70 It may not have been possible to create that state other than as a
federal one. 71 And in Yugoslavia, the various local governments had a great
deal of power.72 But Yugoslavia may also be a poster example of federalism
gone awry.73 Political scientists tend to worry that local allegiances will
breed resentment and distrust of the nation and eventually lead to
dismemberment. The history of Yugoslavia can certainly be read in that
65. Compare AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES (1999) [hereinafter LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY], with AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE
EXPLANATION (1977) [hereinafter LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES] (arguing for
divisions of power, including federal institutions that track ethnic or religious divisions), and G.
BINGHAM POWELL, JR., CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY, AND
VIOLENCE 212-18, 270-71 (1982) [hereinafter POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES]; see also
G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND
PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000) [hereinafter POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS]; G. Bingham
Powell Jr., Political Responsiveness and Constitutional Design, in DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS:
THE LIFE WORK OF AREND LIJPHART 9 (Markus M. L. Crepaz et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Powell,
Political Responsiveness] (casting doubt on the advantages of federalism, including consociational
variants).
66. Larry Diamond et al., Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing
Countries: Some Tentative Findings, 150 WORLD AFFAIRS 5, 12-13 (1987); see also WALZER, supra
note 59.
67. Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."), with JACKSON &
TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 825-26.
68. SEE JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 825-43 (materials on German federalism).
69. See LIPSET, supra note 3, at 64-86; Graham Smith, Mapping the Federal Condition:
Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice, in FEDERALISM: THE MULTIETHNIC CHALLENGE 1,
16-22 (Graham Smith ed., 1996).
70. See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD
WAR 29 (1995).
71. See Vesna Popovski, Yugoslavia: Politics, Federation, Nation, in FEDERALISM: THE
MULTIETHNIC CHALLENGE, supra note 69, at 180, 186-93 (discussing the history of the Yugoslav
Federation).
72. Id. at 188.
73. Id. at 196-203.
74. See supra note 65.
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way.75 While Switzerland has held together,7 6 Belgium77 and Canada,78
among many others, have gone through great internal turbulence related to
their federal structure. Political scientists frequently blame federal borders
for turbulence where the borders follow ethnic divisions.7 9 That may be too
simple, given that we are learning that identities can be reshaped and ethnic
groups exchanged-to use a very sanitary word for a very nasty business.
80
And the distinction seems particularly unhelpful given that the necessary
political bargains tend to require precisely those boundaries that follow
deeply felt distinctions.8 '
Federalism that enacts a political bargain may have to define political
boundaries very sharply in order to engender trust. And as long as the
society remains deeply divided, there may be no alternative to sharp
boundaries both between groups and between federal and national powers.
So it makes sense in such societies for courts to police such bargains. The
French Constitutional Court was developed as part of a political bargain to
protect the Gaulist Constitution, for example.8 2
But as the democracy ages, the issues that have some possibility of
tearing the state apart are likely to change. To protect democracy long after
the Constitution was written, judicial supervision of an antique federal-state
line seems increasingly irrelevant. There is less and less likelihood that lack
of judicial supervision of federalism will undermine a two-century old
democracy. 83
75. See WOODWARD, supra note 70, at 380-82.
76. See Otto K. Kaufmann, Swiss Federalism, in FORGING UNITY OUT OF DIVERSITY: THE
APPROACHES OF EIGHT NATIONS 206, 206 (Robert A. Goldwin et al. eds., 1989); DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 132 (2d ed. 1994); Thomas 0. Hueglin, New Wine in Old
Bottles? Federalism and Nation States in the Twenty-First Century: A Conceptual Overview, in
RETHINKING FEDERALISM: CITIZENS, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 203,
205-09 (Karen Knop et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter RETHINKING FEDERALISM]; JACKSON &
TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 843-62.
77. See Richard Cullen, Adaptive Federalism in Belgium, 13 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 346 (1990);
Alexander Murphy, Belgium 's Regional Divergence: Along the Road to Federation, in FEDERALISM:
THE MULTIETHNIC CHALLENGE, supra note 69, at 73; JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 60, at
925-46.
78. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 889-925.
79. LIPSET, supra note 3, at 81.
80. See WOODWARD, supra note 70.
81. See Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights
and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. I (1996), in JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note
60, at 949-62 (discussing the boundaries of Ethiopia).
82. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1992), excerpted in JACKSON & TUSHNET,
supra note 60, at 504-05.
83. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611, 624 (1842) (Story, J.) (explaining the Court's
Federalism may help to inculcate the necessary skills and attitudes
toward democracy.8 4 It gives many folks an arena -in which to learn and
develop skills. It offers additional opportunities for participation. But that
view of the advantages of federalism has little to do with the particular line-
drawing involved here.
In a more mature democracy, clear national versus federal lines may be
precisely the problem. They may help to aggravate conflicts where the
candidates for elective office have interests in raising precisely those
conflicts.8 5 Or they may aggravate conflicts where the national institutions
become incapable of dealing with common problems because of
jurisdictional issues.8 6 The very clarity of boundaries may encourage local
attachments that reduce the governability of the whole.8 7 In other words, for
political science there is nothing automatic about the benefits of federalism.
In those situations, political organs may police the proper boundaries better
than courts. 88  More permeable bargains may actually assist in defusing
conflict by moving conflicts to arenas in which they can be more
successfully handled. In such societies courts would be better advised to
mind their own business.
Federalism may contribute more to a mature democracy if it provides
competing platforms of power over related, rather than clearly distinguished,
issues. 9  Overlapping power allows the creative tensions which keep all
political actors in check and prevents a slide toward autocracy. One political
scientist, Ian Shapiro, has described freedom as the "multiplication of
dependent relationships" (in stark contrast to slavery which imposes
dependence on a single other). 90 Indeed, political scientists worry that
federal units may exacerbate some of the problems. Juan Linz 9' and Robert
Dahl 92 describe decentralization as moving problems to smaller units that
conclusion that a broad interpretation of the fugitive slave clause was fundamental to the formation
of the Union).
84. The late Harry Eckstein made this point in discussion at the 1994 meeting of the American
Political Science Association.
85. See Grofman & Stockwell, supra note 3, at 5-6.
86. See WOODWARD, supra note 70 at 84.
87. See, e.g., I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 296 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1966) (1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (remarks of Mr. Hamilton, June 18, 1787
(expressing fear that state attachments and influence would weaken or destroy the national
government)).
88. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
89. LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 65, at 53-103; see also infra notes
144-46 and accompanying text
90. Ian Shapiro, Notes Toward a Conditional Theory of Rights and Obligations in Property, in
STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB et al., JURISPRUDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ITS APPLICATIONS 998, 999 (2d ed. 2006).
91. JUAN J. LNz, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, &
REEQUILIBRATION 8, 62 (1978).
92. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 102-
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may be less able to handle them fairly. 93 A more flexible federalism may
alleviate some of those problems.
In other words, the role that federalism plays and the manner in which it
plays that role change. They are not fixed for the life of a republic, but are
reshaped by it. Precisely because federalism is a method of conflict
resolution, its contribution changes with the conflicts. It is not set in stone
tablets for all time.
Another concern raised by political science is the impact of
constitutional provisions on the quality of democratic government and on the
extent to which government reflects and responds to the governed.
94
There is in fact little that is automatic about whether federalism
advances or retards democracy. Madison famously argued that a larger
republic would be more fair. 95 He gave the slave states as an example and
suggested that the nation would be fairer to the slaves than the southern
states would be.
The problem of fairness that Madison described with respect to slavery,
and that Martha Minow has described with respect to several modem
conflicts,9 6 is a problem concerning the quality of democracy. Majorities
can be thwarted by federalism in the same way that gerrymandering can
thwart them. By breaking groups into fragments, individual groups can be
submerged. By stacking and cracking them, majorities can be defeated,
submerged, and subordinated by the dominant culture or group. 97 There is
07(1982).
93. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 866-67 (1995) (citing William A. Fischel, Exploring the
Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
865, 886 (1991) (empirically supporting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison))).
94. See generally POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 65; Powell, Political
Responsiveness, supra note 67.
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
96. See Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA, 77 (Mark Tushnet ed.
1990).
97. Stacking and cracking are the terms used in discussions of gerrymandering. Some votes are
wasted by stacking or packing as many people of one political stripe into one or a small number of
districts, while the remaining votes are wasted by cracking or spreading them into as many districts
as possible where they cannot outvote the competing group. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Districting
and the Meanings of Pluralism: The Court's Futile Search for Standards in Kiryas Joel, in THE U. S.
SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 58 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000) (applying the
concepts of gerrymandering to the drawing of school districts); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Identifying
Gerrymanders, 15 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 540, 546-53 (1971) (explaining gerrymandering as a
combination of otherwise benign procedures to produce a distorted result).
no automatically appropriate federal division of the population that reflects
democracy best.
Robert Dahl, a foremost student of democracy, has explained this
problem at length. The majority principle and the principle of fairness may,
or may not, both require ever-greater inclusiveness so that the needs of the
larger population are met. 98 There is no principled point at which one can
stop enlarging or dividing the borders. 99
Federalism can be a method of conflict resolution,' 00 and can have either
democratic or undemocratic consequences-the latter especially where
federalism confirms local autocratic control. Federalism may be a necessary
part of a political bargain required to get democracy going. It may
contribute more to infant democracies by protecting strongly felt political
bargains with clear lines.' 0' Legal language and legal institutions can
cement bargains and offer each side protection against the likelihood of
being taken advantage of in the resulting constitution. 102 The risks of failure
to abide by obligations are obvious in many of the world's current conflicts.
Federalism typically comes about by means of a deal among the
powerful, designed to protect their control over territory or people or issues
or to protect themselves from control by those they fear. Federalism, then,
may be an unavoidable compromise or a wise one-an efficient
decentralization or an inefficient duplication of resources. It may reflect
tolerance for different cultures or it may be an invitation to intolerance by
segregating people and maximizing the differences among them. If travel
(sometimes called "exit")'0 3 is less threatening than staying put, people may
segregate themselves as they did in India and Pakistan and in many recent
conflicts in response to racial, religious, and ethnic attacks. If there are
opportunities that cut across federal units, people may be inclined to learn to
work and live together. If different sections share problems they may be
inclined to work together in solving them. How federalism turns out is
historical-there may be no universally right way to divide populations,
though there may be wrong ways that lead societies to threaten their
members with mayhem.
98. DAHL, supra note 92, at 85-107.
99. Id.
100. My colleagues have pointed this out in discussion.
101. See generally GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, To CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITIONS (1990).
102. See Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91
AM. POL. Sc1. REV. 245 (1997); see also DI PALMA, supra note 101.
103. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970).
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VL. THE COURT AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The political scientists' view of federalism is virtually unrecognizable in
the Court's definitional approach. This is particularly true of the issue of
moderating conflict.
There certainly are areas in which the country is dealing with major
internal conflicts, but the Court has not treated those areas as appropriate for
federalism. In its cases on racial justice and affirmative action, the Court has
insisted on "congruence," "skepticism," and "consistency" so that state and
federal resolutions are treated alike. 0 4 It has similarly treated state and
federal statutes alike on the social issues. 0 5 In the environmental cases the
Court has supported private challenges to both state 0 6 and federal'0 7
regulation, although the Court invokes federalism in its decisions on federal
environmental regulations. Its decisions evenhandedly condemn regulation
in both contexts. In that form, it makes conflict more, rather than less,
intense.
The Roberts Court has paid no more attention to cooling controversy
than the Rehnquist Court did. Private individuals were insulated from
federal regulation in Rapanos despite state lack of objection. In fact state
officials told one of the private developers to cease and desist,'0 8 objected to
the proposal by the other petitioners, 109 and joined thirty-two other states in
104. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-31 (1995) (holding that state and
national policies regarding race, including affirmative action, are subject to the same constitutional
restrictions).
105. Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (approving federal restrictions on
reproductive services), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(approving most state limitations despite continuing to uphold a right to some abortions). See also
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of North New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006), which vacated an
injunction of a partial birth abortion statute in order to remand for a narrower ruling on the specific
problems with the statute, but in other respects reaching a decision consistent with Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), which held a statute banning partial birth abortion invalid for its
failure to include an exception for the health of the mother, among other issues. In Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the Federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Act. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding
unconstitutional a Texas statute banning certain homosexual conduct).
106. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004)
(preempting state air quality regulation). Other cases decided under the Takings Clause have
restricted state regulation. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
107. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
108. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2239.
109. Id.
urging affirmance."' On comparably local facts, private individuals were
subjected to federal regulation despite state objections in Gonzales v.
Raich."' Federalism may have cooled a controversy in Gonzales v. Oregon
by letting Oregon handle a disputed issue according to its own standards, but
the conservatives who have been most vocal about federalism objected." 2
Federalism on the Roberts Court does not appear to be related to mitigating
controversy.
The conservative justices' historical argument-that they are enforcing
the Founders' understanding of federalism-would precisely meet the
concerns of political scientists if the Court were writing in the late
eighteenth or early nineteenth century. The major concern about
congressional power in 1787 was slavery."13 There surely was a risk that
anti-slavery decisions would lead to disunion and civil war, much as the pro-
slavery Dred Scott decision ultimately did."14 That concern is now settled
and the aftermath governed by amended constitutional language.' Thus,
closely tracking eighteenth century concerns results in a very perverse
version of federalism, in which contemporary decisions are governed by
protection of slavery which we constitutionally outlawed more than a
century ago. That disconnect between the concerns of the present and the
concerns of the distant past underscores the divergence between the
instrumental concerns of empirical political science and the definitional
concerns of the Court-even, or perhaps especially, were we able to discern
the specific solution the Framers would have applied. 116
It is quite likely that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
insisted that the Court have jurisdiction of cases "arising under the
Constitution" because they wanted judicial protection for the various
110. See Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (No. 04-1034), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 98.
111. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress' power to regulate purely local
activities that constitute a "class of activities" having a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
112. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts,
C.J., and Thomas, J.); id. at 299 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. See infra notes 114, 122-24 and accompanying text.
114. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Justice Story suggested that the South would not have joined the
Union but for its ability to secure the return of slaves from free states without the niceties of local
process. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 624 (1842). Justice Story was almost certainly wrong
about the meaning in 1787 but may have been right about 1842. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED
SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006) (concluding that the Prigg decision was
correct if the purpose was to keep the Union together); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-68 (1975) (discussing the opinions in Prigg). See
generally PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS
(1997).
115. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
116. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980); Karl Llewelyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934)
(arguing that a precise originalism is increasingly inappropriate as a constitution ages).
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bargains they had struck." l7  But even on the assumption that an
understanding of the Commerce Clause was crucial to that bargain, they
didn't tell us what issues they expected the courts to face. The record of the
Convention suggests that their principle concern was the distribution of
political representation. But they had little to say about the most potentially
expansive national powers. "'
Moreover the delegates in the Convention told us little about the
meaning of the Commerce Clause and its extent. The Convention instructed
the Committee of Detail to provide the new Congress with all the powers of
the old, as well as power where the individual states were separately
"incompetent" or the harmony of the union required it: "(and moreover) to
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those
to which the States are separately incompetent."' 19
The Committee of Detail's response to those instructions was to give the
new Congress two powers that the old did not have-the powers to tax and
otherwise raise revenue, and the power to regulate commerce.120  If those
powers were equivalent to the instructions to the Committee, the Spending
and Commerce Clauses would seem expansive. There were a variety of
other proposed powers, some which are in the final Constitution and some
which were rejected. 121  But the meaning of those decisions depends on
whether we, as interpreters, assume that the various clauses must have been
mutually exclusive, or overlapping. Certainly, as lawyers, we frequently
117. 2 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 430 (proceedings on August 27, 1787).
118. See CLINTON RosSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) (arguing that the
Convention was dominated by nationalists, the major battles were about representation, not powers,
and that once the representation issues were settled, the powers of Congress were a common,
harmonious objective to be broadly understood); see also CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONSTITUTION
MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 64-100 (1988)
(arguing that while representation dominated many of the issues, only a coalition of the geographical
extremes of the new nation, rather than a larger coalition of smaller states, opposed expansive
powers).
119. 2 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 26-27 (records of July 17, 1787); see also id. at 131-32
(proceedings of the Convention as they were referred to the Committee of Detail).
120. Compare the Articles of Confederation with the report of the Committee of Detail, 2
FARRAND, supra note 87, at 181-82 (records of the proceedings on August 6, 1787), and U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 8-10. The Spending Power was added by the Committee of Style. 2 FARRAND,
supra note 87, at 569 (records of the proceedings on September 10, 1787).
12 1. On proposed powers to grant charters or build canals, see 2 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 32 1,
325-326 (August 18, 1787), 615-16, 620 (September 14, 1787). See also Albert S. Abel, The
Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L.
REV. 432, 479-80 (1941) (urging a negative inference from the rejection of powers); Robert L. Stem,
That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1934)
(urging an inclusive definition).
multiply language, like the familiar "right, title, and interest," in order to be
sure of coverage, and without any thought that the expansion of language
narrows, rather than enlarges, the meanings. The assumptions about the
relationship of powers, proposed, adopted, or rejected are our own. The
drafters did not tell us.
Slavery's exertion of a major force on the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause before the Civil War is instructive. Many pre-Civil War
debates about the meaning of the Commerce Clause and many Supreme
Court decisions in that period were drawn with slavery in mind, to construct
an understanding of commerce that did not touch slavery. 122 In the Virginia
ratifying convention, three former delegates to the Constitutional
Convention debated whether the Constitution gave Congress power over
slavery beyond the prohibition of the slave trade. But despite the fact that
the Convention repeatedly dealt with slavery and repeatedly provided for it,
they could only point to the absence of specific language dealing with
congressional power over slavery and their understanding that their Northern
colleagues had no intention of interfering.' 
23
But the Convention refused several attempts to protect state internal
police powers from federal interference. 124 And the delegates did not tell us
whether they understood state control over slavery within state borders as
the basis of a principled understanding of state and national powers, as a
specific resolution of one conflict that on a principled level existed in
tension with understandings of the Commerce Clause with respect to other
issues, or simply relied on their expected power in the House of
Representatives.
122. For counsel's use of Southern intransigence on slavery, see Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449,
lvii-lviii, lxv (1841). But see F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 794 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Pinckney had urged a broad congressional
power to negative all laws it might think improper-a position which seems inconsistent with the
conclusion that Pinckney sought a commerce power narrowed in all respects because of his fears
regarding slavery). On the status of persons under the Commerce Clause, see Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 136 (1837), and Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 474 (1849)
(Taney, C.J., dissenting). On the fears of Southern rejection of the Constitution, see Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 536, 611 (1842). On Justice Story's opinion in Prigg, see COVER, supra note
114, at 234, 240-41. See also Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE
L.J. 198, 198-99 (1968) (explaining that Madison and Justice Story were influential in promoting the
Southern view of the Commerce Clause). On the related effort to establish a Southern understanding
of the impact of the slave clauses on the Commerce Clause, see 3 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 442-
44, and Berns, supra, at 199 (noting that the terms migration and importation referred only to the
international movement respectively of whites and blacks); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 216-17
(1824) (holding that migration refers to voluntary movement only but Marshall does not follow
Pinckney by restricting it to an international context); and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 411
(1856) (Taney, C.J.) (holding that both migration and importation refer to slaves).
123. 3 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 334-35 (June 21, 1788, remarks of Randolph, Mason and
Madison).
124. See id. at 21 (July 17, 1787); id. at 629 (September 29, 1787).
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The delegates' silence is deafening, and can only be filled in with our
assumptions, not theirs. Either it seems reasonable to us that silence meant a
limitation to a minimal state, or it seems reasonable to us that silence left the
definition of the appropriate boundaries to subsequent generations and that
the Founders were not terribly concerned about what we might do centuries
later.
Much of the pre-Civil War Southern attack on national power was
conducted around theoretical assertions of states' rights.125 The language of
sovereignty was not used in the Constitution and by the time of its creation
in 1787, sovereignty was generally understood to reside in the people, not
their governments. 12 6 But the defense of state sovereignty was convenient
for Southern slaveowners intent on protecting their "peculiar institution"
from Northern antipathy. 127
Even in the pre-Civil War era, Chief Justice Marshall, a nationalist from
Virginia, famously extended national power in cases like Gibbons v. Ogden,
writing that Congress had power to regulate those activities that affected
more states than one. 128 That became the grounding of the expansive view
of the Commerce Clause that dominated decisions from 1937 to 1987. 129
One might expect that the Civil War would have removed the weight of
slavery from the Constitution, but from shortly after the Civil War to 1937
the Court built ever-tighter boundaries to national power. 130  In turn, the
Rehnquist Court looked back to that era, and to cases still dominated by the
spectre of national power over the South's "peculiar institution."131
125. Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261,
263 (2000).
126. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 599-600
(1969).
127. Finkelman, supra note 125, at 263, 265-66, 275-79. Pinckney of South Carolina was the first
to use the term in the Constitutional Convention. See I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 59 (May 31,
1787). On the effort to establish a Southern understanding of the impact of the slave clauses on the
Commerce Clause, see 3 FARRAND, supra note 87, at 442-44 (from a speech in the House of
Representatives, Feb. 14, 1820); Bems, supra note 122 (describing the Southern effort to narrow the
meaning of the Commerce Clause to exclude any power over slavery).
128. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824).
129. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I I I (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate
whatever affects commerce).
130. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
131. In United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist reviewed the history of the Commerce
Clause cases in a way which seems decidedly sympathetic to the pre-1937 cases, concluding, "[b]ut
even these modem-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce
Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
553-57 (1995). Justice Thomas was more candid, writing:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many
If the shape of federalism is the result of political bargaining, sometimes
to protect the power of the people doing the bargaining, and sometimes to
resolve political issues in a way that people in different parts of the republic
will perceive as fair, then there is no universal answer about what federalism
should look like. Federalism should be a prime instance of the political
question doctrine that tells courts to keep out.'32
Even assuming that judicial review of the federal bargains struck in the
Constitution were important in 1787, there is little reason to believe that
those bargains require the same specific protection two centuries later rather
than an understanding of federalism driven by its principles and values for
the nation as it now exists. It is also doubtful whether any of the delegates
expected that the bargains they were striking would be interpreted two
centuries later as if the Court were sitting in 1787, as some originalists insist.
The delegates were quite convinced that the United States would change and
grow. The Court's concept of a static America is quaint by comparison.
VII. POLITICAL SCIENTISTS' VIEW OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The Court's version of federalism is virtually unrecognizable to political
scientists. Sovereignty of subunits doesn't resonate with any particular
advantage in political science. For political scientists, sovereignty is a
problem, not an explanation.'33 Clarifying the lines of authority has a nice
ring to it, but for political scientists there are questions and trade-offs. The
trade-off with checks and balances is particularly significant because the
Court's clarification of authority eliminates much of the mutual restraint.
And there is a trade-off among various measures of fairness. While
local control meant democracy to the Anti-Federalists, it meant political
"faction" and unfair treatment of identifiable groups to Madison and
supporters of the Constitution. 1 4  In that sense it does not extend the
benefits of democracy to all. Political scientists find that localities use
power to "keep[] classes, races, ethnic groups, genders, and life-style groups
in their places."135 Against a standard of just government, federalism can be
cited by both sides. In effect, the definition of federalism is political and
contextual rather than a subject of universal, unchanging principles.
believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past
60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we
cannot wipe the slate clean.
Id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
133. See Richard Simeon & Katherine Swinton, Introduction: Rethinking Federalism in a
Changing World, in RETHINKING FEDERALISM, supra note 76, at 3.
134. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
135. Theodore J. Lowi, Our Millennium: Political Science Confronts the Global Corporate
Economy, 22 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 131, 141-42 (2001).
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Justice Blackmun suggested, in words quite congenial to the Rehnquist
Court, that federalism can protect personal liberty: "[Flederalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.'
136
Justice Blackmun meant that federalism is valuable when and if it advances
liberty, but not otherwise. He made the comment in a case where the
petitioner was being denied any review, state or federal, of a conviction for
murder. His point was that deference to the states does not automatically
advance liberty. As Blackmun put it: "Federalism . . . has no inherent
normative value: It does not, as the majority appears to assume, blindly
protect the interests of States from any incursion by the federal courts."'
137
Subsequent decisions have treated the relationship as axiomatic. In
Lopez, the Court barred federal power to ban guns from schools. 138 The
objective of the majority in that and later cases was not the blending and
duplication of powers that Blackmun understood could protect liberty, but
rather a delineation that removed one of the governments from any ability to
affect the outcome. In Lopez, the Court prevented the federal government
from protecting children from weapons in their schools. How that protects
liberty is much less clear.
From an empirical perspective, there are large problems with the Court's
proposition that federalism advances liberty. As Madison understood,
39
federalism can thwart liberty; many groups around the world look to more
cosmopolitan entities to protect them. 40  Although the United States
Supreme Court looked the other way, state-level oligarchy and Southern
state treatment of blacks, abolitionists, and Northern sympathizers was
precisely the reason why Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to
change federal relations.'
4
'
136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Rehnquist
Court repeatedly quoted Justice Blackmun. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576; New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
137. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759.
138. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576.
139. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
140. See Minow, supra note 96.
141. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 128-29 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting).
[T]here was less danger of tyranny in the head than of anarchy and tyranny in the
members ... . It is necessary to enable the government of the nation to secure to every
one within its jurisdiction the rights and privileges enumerated .... By the Constitution,
as it stood before the war, ample protection was given against oppression by the Union,
but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That want was intended
to be supplied by this amendment.
Id. Indeed, one can easily argue that from 1787 to 1865 and from 1876 to about 1960, i.e. most of
the history of this country, the national government was considerably more democratic than most
James Madison described the Constitution as partly national and partly
federal, 142 and he and Hamilton described important ways in which the two
levels would restrain each other.14 1 In the context of the separation of
powers among the branches of the federal government, Madison argued for a
blending, rather than a clear division, of powers as the more effective
guarantee. 144  He told us that by blending powers we would enable
governments to control each other. 145 It was precisely the overlapping of
powers that created the possibility of protecting liberty. Overlap between
state and federal jurisdictions permits each to investigate the other, to
compete for public support, and to provide a staging ground for opposition
as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions did in 1798 and 1799.146
Opponents of our Constitution wanted the kind of clear division of powers
that the Court has advanced. But those who wrote and supported it had a
more sophisticated understanding of federalism.
Even more, a clear delineation of powers may make some problems
unsolvable, thus frustrating democracy. This is true of any situation in
which the source of the problem extends beyond state borders and requires
regulation of external entities, whether corporations, other businesses, or
other states. Democracy can also be frustrated where the state political
machinery is too corrupt to clean itself up.
Was James Madison right when he told the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia that a larger republic would be fairer than a smaller one?
147
The government of the larger republic would have to consider different
perspectives, and people in a larger republic would be less likely to gang up
state governments.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) (discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause and
restrictions on the power of the states and pointing out the extent to which the states would restrain
the national government); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 9 (James Madison) ("The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing "additional securities to republican
government, to liberty, and to property... [from] the restraints which the preservation of the Union
will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single
States, who might acquire credit and influence enough from leaders and favorites to become the
despots of the people .... ").
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) ("[Ulnless these departments be so far
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which ... [is] essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
146. See The Virginia Resolution of December 21, 1798, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, at 135 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/virres.htm; The Kentucky Resolution of November 10, 1799,
reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 131, available at
http://www.yale.eduL/lawweb/avalon/kenres.htm.
147. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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on smaller parts. Madison thought the United States would have been fairer
to blacks than the Southern states would have been. So it would be wise to
give central authorities the powers they would need. As it turned out, the
new nation limited the escape of slaves for the first eighty years when some
of the Northern States would have been inclined to protect runaway blacks
and give them the rights of free men. The nation only secured their
emancipation following a war none of the individual states could or would
have pursued.
Or was Madison wrong? Political scientists find support for
decentralized systems, and the political science data indicates that
decentralization works. It increases stability. 148 But their treatment of
federalism is appropriately agnostic on the issue of fairness. 149
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Courts focus on definitions, and sometimes on objectives. When they
focus on objectives, courts often attempt to elucidate the Founders' ideas. In
the case of federalism, the United States Supreme Court has focused on
ideas about accountability and what has seemed to the Court the automatic
libertarian consequences of a strict division of powers.
Political scientists, on the other hand, have focused on the ambiguous
relationship of federalism and democracy. Federalism often helps to secure
democracy but can also support conflicts that tear it apart. Political
scientists have not focused on the question of the clarity of boundaries that
has occupied the courts. But political scientists' theories of pluralism do
suggest that clarity of boundaries will also have an ambiguous relationship
to democratization and the stability of democracy-potentially reducing
stress and strengthening democracy when inter-regional trust is absent, but
potentially weakening democracy by emphasizing regional competition and
differences.
To put that another way, whether the boundaries need to be sharp
depends entirely on political circumstances. There is no reason to believe
that the courts will prove wiser than the politicians in discerning whether
and where the tensions are in fact so sharp and what resolution would calm
them. And there is good reason to believe that an aging conceptual federal-
148. See Diamond et al., supra note 66, at 12-13.
149. See Powell, Political Responsiveness, supra note 65.
state boundary will make it harder to resolve contemporary disputes. The
Court may have had it right, from an empirical perspective, in Garcia. 150
The United States Supreme Court has focused on a concept of
federalism that has little resonance in either political science or history. It
has ignored the value of federalism both for the resolution of conflicts and as
a mutual check among different layers of government against excesses of the
others. Indeed, other than its claims with respect to federalism, the Court
has largely abandoned protection of the democratic process in favor of
interfering with political judgments. 5 ' It has become a hindrance to
democratic self-government rather than a help.
The United States Supreme Court's federalism doctrine hobbles modem
democracy by careful attention to feuds which no longer bum-indeed it has
"protected" states from exercises of national power that were sought by the
vast majority of states.152
The United States Supreme Court's formal definitional approach to
federalism contrasts with political scientists' understanding of federalism as
about shifting jurisdiction over issues which are too hot to handle. There is
nothing in the Court's approach that tracks or considers the risks of national
versus local resolution for political outcomes. The result is that it
consistently both misses the point and exacerbates the problem.
150. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court
concluded:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them
under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their
citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone
else-including the judiciary--deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state
immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of
governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
Id. at 546. Conversely, the Court concluded that political forces were the major limitation on the
extent of national power:
Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of
Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role
of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.
It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed
in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.
Id. at 550-51.
151. 1 have discussed the Court's treatment of democratic rights. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 46, at
38-48; Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Rehnquist Court (1986- ): Radical Revision of American
Constitutional Law, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 327, 336-40
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
152. See, e.g., Brief of the States of Arizona, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners'
Brief on the Merits, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (1999), 1999 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
219 (arguing that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was properly enacted pursuant to the
federal government's commerce power).
